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Many of our rights are important because they give rise to
rituals. That is, the right is valuable not only because its holders
can insist upon something that is their due, but because the exercise of the right has useful social or psychological consequences.
Miranda warnings are an example: part of their value lies in the
fact that by reciting them, an interrogating officer performs a rite
of self-abnegation, a ritual acknowledgment that he or she does not
have total power over the suspect.2 The criminal jury trial may be
another example of a different kind: part of its purpose may be to
serve as a ceremony that mAkes us more comfortable about inflicting punishment.'
Lee Bollinger argues that the institution of free speech, established by the First Amendment, functions principally as a kind of
didactic ritual: by requiring us to be tolerant of the most abhorrent
speech, the First Amendment teaches us to be tolerant throughout
political life. Bollinger's primary focus is on what he calls "extremist speech." His principal example of extremist speech is the effort
a few years ago by a Nazi group to march in Skokie, Illinois, a
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Chicago suburb with a large Jewish population that includes several thousand survivors of concentration camps. Bollinger rejects,
not as worthless but rather as insufficient and obsolete, what he
sees as the two principal received justifications for providing legal
protection to such extremist speech: the view that all speech, including extremist speech, must be protected so that democratic
politics can function successfully; and the theory that if extremist
speech is not tolerated, the government will be able to suppress
speech that is unquestionably valuable and worthy of protection.
He argues instead that the purpose of free speech is to teach selfcontrol by forcing people to tolerate an activity they would like to
suppress. In particular, this enforced toleration teaches us to understand and control the "impulse toward intolerance" that is present in everyone-an impulse that has its legitimate claims, Bollinger says, but that, if unchecked, can have devastating consequences for society.
Perhaps this is a predictable compliment, but it is true nonetheless: this book admirably reflects the kind of "tolerant mind"
that its author esteems. Bollinger's tone is civilized, sensitive, and
restrained. His arguments have none of the "my theory, right or
wrong" quality that sometimes characterizes theoretical legal writing. He persuades by being reasonable and plausible; he is careful
to give the arguments he rejects the credit they deserve. This is not
a euphemistic way of saying that this is an uninteresting or unoriginal book. On the contrary, it is filled with interesting and controversial observations about human behavior, social practices, and
the law and literature of the First Amendment. As I will explain, I
disagree with several of the points Bollinger makes. But I cannot
recall a single occasion on which I thought his arguments were superficial or unfair.
I.
Bollinger begins by challenging what he calls the "classical"
defense of free speech. This is the view that free speech is necessary to enlightened democratic self-government because the suppression of information and ideas thwarts the search for truth and
impairs a political system's ability to reach the right decisions (pp.
45-50)." In acknowledging, ungrudgingly, that this view has considerable force, Bollinger characteristically relies on an insight into

4 All parenthetical page references are to Lee C. Bollinger, The Tolerant Society. Freedom of Speech and Extremist Speech in America (1986).
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personal psychology: he points out that we all know from our personal lives that dialogue with others helps us reach better decisions. And he acknowledges that the "classical" defense of free
speech is of great importance when a community is trying to establish "the minimally essential conditions of a 'democratic' society"
(p. 51).
But while some level of free exchange of information and ideas
is necessary to a self-governing society, our society has far surpassed that level, Bollinger says, and we could suppress a good
deal of extremist speech without rendering ourselves literally incapable of democratic self-government (p. 51). Most Western European nations, for example, have laws forbidding speech that incites
racial hatred, including speech that is almost certainly constitutionally protected here (pp. 39 n.66, 254-56).
Bollinger also attacks the classical view, as others have, on the
ground that it prevents us from applying to speech the kind of
cost-benefit calculations that we unhesitatingly apply in dealing
with actions (see pp. 13-14, 22, 35-36, 54-58).' Perhaps speech is, in
general, less harmful than action. But is it plausible to say that
speech is so much less harmful that the government has free rein
to regulate action but can almost never regulate speech? Perhaps,
as John Stuart Mill argued, the search for truth is advanced by
confrontation even with egregiously false ideas.' But do we really
believe that the search for truth is advanced by allowing the Nazis
to march? Or, more precisely, is the likelihood that the Nazis will
contribute to our search for truth really great enough to outweigh
the harms that their speech will inflict-in particular, the very real
emotional suffering of the concentration camp victims (pp. 5456)? 7 Bollinger meets the usual objection-if Skokie can lawfully
suppress the Nazis, then segregationist communities could have
suppressed civil rights demonstrators-by denying that it is impossible to draw the necessary lines. After all, we have no difficulty
drawing a line that prohibits the actions that the Nazis advocated
while permitting the actions supported by the civil rights movement (pp. 38-39). Why should we have any more difficulty drawing
a line that distinguishes the speech of those two groups?

5 See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Pornography and the First Amendment, 1986 Duke L. J.
589.
6 John Stuart Mill, On Liberty ch. 2, 1l 1, 19-32, in The Philosophy of John Stuart
Mill 205, 223-37 (Marshall Cohen, ed. 1961) ("Mill's Philosophy").
7 See Harry H. Wellington, On Freedom of Expression, 88 Yale L.J. 1105, 1106-07
(1979).
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In addition to his effective presentation of these familiar challenges to the "classical" defense of free speech, Bollinger offers two
somewhat unconventional arguments. The first is to compare political debate to the debate we allow before a jury (p. 56). In a jury
trial, we believe that we are more likely to arrive at the truth by
refusing to allow anything that remotely resembles the "uninhibited, robust and wide-open" 8 expression that First Amendment
doctrine extols. We take the opposite approach: .we carefully screen
out emotional or inflammatory speech, or speech that is likely to
be accorded "too much weight." 9 Bollinger argues that if the purpose of the First Amendment were really to promote the search for
truth, we would apply to public debate the same rules that supposedly enhance the search for truth in a jury trial. There are answers
to this argument: for example, the factual truth sought in a jury
trial is different from the kind of "truth" sought through public
debate; and the way in which a jury decides-by giving brief but
highly focused consideration to a relatively narrow question, without any opportunity for reconsideration at a later date-is not at
all characteristic of public debate. But Bollinger's analogy to a jury
trial is still fairly persuasive in suggesting that the classical view of
the First Amendment is not the entire story.
Bollinger argues in addition that the defense of the classical
view systematically ignores the virtues of intolerance (pp. 6268, J71). People confronted with an idea they abhor, Bollinger says,
have a deep need to express their abhorrence. Intolerance is itself a
"communicative act[]," a "form of expression intended to avoid
creating the wrong impression-either that we don't really believe
what we claim to believe or that we don't have the courage of our
convictions or the power to defend them" (p. 63, emphasis omitted). Both individuals and communities define themselves by refusing to tolerate certain ideas, and if they are forced to tolerate an
abhorrent view they may "feel implicated in, and their identity
tarnished by," that view (p. 71). In reply to the contention that
one should express intolerance ofa view by speaking against it, not
by suppressing it, Bollinger argues that legal prohibition is a particularly effective way for a community to express its opposition to
an idea (pp. 71-72).
The other conventional defense of free speech that Bollinger
8 New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 270 (1964).
9 See, e.g., Fed. Rule Evid. 403 (relevant evidence may be excluded if its probative
value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion, or misleading
the jury).
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challenges is what he calls the "fortress model" (pp. 76-103). According to one version of this view, there is a more or less constant
danger that "the government" will suppress speech with which it
disagrees. In view of the costs of litigation, including the chance
that courts will err and the dangers of self-censorship, we risk losing much valuable speech if we do not have a clear doctrinal barrier-a fortress-that precludes the suppression of almost any
speech, including extremist speech (pp. 77-79).
Bollinger asserts-perhaps too quickly-that this conception
is artificial and unrealistic in assuming that the threat comes from
"the government" (p. 79). With relatively rare exceptions, he says,
efforts to suppress speech are the result of popular sentiment, not
of the independent decisions of government officials; the officials
are just acting as intermediaries for the popular will (pp. 79-80).
Bollinger then dissects the view that the constitutional protection for free speech is needed as a fortress against popular efforts
to suppress speech (pp. 92-95). He notes that the conception of
human nature underlying this theory almost directly contradicts
the classical theory (p. 92). The classical theory views people as
rational creatures who will arrive at the truth if only given a
chance to think and discuss. The fortress theory, by contrast, takes
a pessimistic view of human nature; it proceeds from the assumption that people are likely to be intolerant of any behavior, including speech, that deviates from their own, and that people are prone
to give in to the intolerant impulse to suppress such speech or
behavior.
Bollinger raises several probing questions about the system
that the fortress theory prescribes. Isn't that theory inconsistent
with the premises of democratic government? If people are so irrationally intolerant, why do we trust them to make any decisions;
why do we trust them to regulate behavior other than speech? After all, the impulse to excessive intolerance can lead to harsh and
oppressive political decisions about all behavior, not just about
speech (p. 92). In any event, if people are that prone to intolerance, why does it matter whether dissidents can speak? The intolerant masses will just ignore them; the freedom to speak will be an
empty right (pp. 94-95). And if people generally are prone to be
intolerant, isn't that a powerful argument against allowing speech
that, like the Nazis', advocates extreme intolerance (p. 93)? Isn't
there far too great a danger that such speech will be persuasive?
Doesn't it follow from the psychological premises of the fortress
theory that we should adopt the jury trial model-that is, we
should carefully restrict the extent to which we permit speech that
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panders to the tendency of the people to be intolerant?
Bollinger develops his own view in counterpoint to the fortress
theory. The purpose of the institution of free speech, he says, is
not to build a redoubt against intolerance and the intolerant but
rather to teach all citizens how to control the impulse toward intolerance in themselves.
In contrast to the fortress theory, which addresses intolerance
as a danger only in the area of speech, Bollinger's approach begins
from the premise that excessive intolerance can be a threat
throughout political life. That is why it is so important that we be
educated to control it (p. 116). Speech is a good area in which to
practice self-control because the stakes are lower than in the area
of conduct: less harm will be done if we tolerate bad speech than if
we tolerate bad actions (p. 124). But we exercise "extraordinary
self-restraint" (p. 120) toward speech in order to teach ourselves to
be more tolerant throughout "the whole tapestry of social intercourse" (p. 119). In particular, if the impulse toward intolerance is
not controlled, it can undermine the give-and-take necessary in a
democracy (pp. 117-18).
The institution of free speech serves this educative function in
several ways. First, Bollinger says, the "public and perhaps rather
rigid and indiscriminate rejection of the [intolerant] type of thinking deemed improper . . . symboliz[es] the 'proper' way of thinking, which, it is hoped, will then be employed throughout all areas
of behavior" (p. 122). When people tolerate harmful speech-when
the residents of Skokie tolerate the emotionally bruising speech of
the Nazis, for example-their "self-restraint in the face of the injury sustained" has a broader social meaning; it "demonstrates
powerfully, more powerfully than a general injunction to be appropriately tolerant in all circumstances ever would, to [them]selves
and others, a commitment to exercise moderation throughout social intercourse" (p. 123).
Second, enforced tolerance makes us confront the motivations
underlying our impulse to be intolerant-motivations that, according to Bollinger, are often a mix of the good (for example, a desire
to dissociate oneself from an abhorrent idea) and the bad (for example, a desire to suppress differences among people or to make
scapegoats of the extremists). When we are forced to confront the
speech itself and therefore our impulse to suppress it, we may be
led to try to purge ourselves of the illegitimate aspects of our motivations (pp. 126-31). Third, since extremist speech often reflects
the attitudes of the intolerant mind-contempt for the views of
others, "incapacity to cope with uncertainty in human affairs," and
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a "quest for simple and clear answers" (p. 131)-exposure to such
speech enables us to identify those attitudes and resolve not to entertain them ourselves (p. 132). Finally, the institution of free
speech requires us to practice self-control; from tolerating extremist speech, Bollinger says, "we derive something of the same personal meaning and satisfaction of the religious fast, a self-initiated
and extraordinary exposure to temptation that reaffirms the possibility of self-control over generally troublesome impulses" (p. 143).
One might ask why Bollinger's theory requires us to tolerate
offensive expression and not other offensive things, like loud noises
or foul odors. Bollinger does not address this question explicitly,
but his answer seems to be implicit in his discussion of the difference between tolerance and passivity (or, as he calls it, "obedience"). Tolerance, he says, i an active capacity. It is not just a
matter of accepting something that one dislikes; it involves engaging that which one dislikes, analyzing what is repellent about it,
and considering whether one should submit to it or not. Bollinger
explains that "[t]he mind sought through free speech is distinguishable from the obedient mind in this one critical respect: . . .
the tolerant mind sought through free speech is free to consider
openly, to entertain seriously, the possibility of disobedience" (p.
247). Ideas, unlike noises, can force one to engage and question
and to consider the possibility that one's own ideas might be
wrong. For that reason, Bollinger seems to say, exposure to ideas
with which one disagrees teaches the active capacity of tolerance
instead of just enforcing passivity or obedience.
Bollinger spends one chapter developing some of the striking
implications that his theory has for First Amendment doctrine (pp.
175-212). For example, he asserts that regulation of the content of
speech should no longer be viewed as a greater threat than regulation of the time and place of speech (pp. 200-02). The purpose of
free speech is to ensure that citizens confront views with which
they disagree; time and place restrictions may enable many persons to avoid all such confrontations, thereby defeating the purpose of the institution. Restrictions on the content of speech might
not have that effect. "A frequent and full confrontation with some
offending speech may be more beneficial than is more limited contact with all speech" (p. 202).
Bollinger's theory also leads him to take several positions directly contrary to those taken by most defenders of the First
Amendment. Bollinger urges that in times of strong public sentiment, such as wartime, it is less, not more necessary to protect dissident speech. To support this conclusion, he invokes his view that
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a community has a legitimate interest in maintaining its "identity"
by being intolerant of certain speech (p. 191), and he again relies
on an insight into personal psychology:
We do not expect parents to be "objective" in the way they
think about their children ..
. The way we think about people for whom we feel love or affection is to some extent inconsistent with a frame of mind in which we are continually prepared to reexamine that thinking with cool detachment. Love,
like religious faith, requires something of a withholding of
critical judgment.
This seems equally true in certain periods of a nation's
life. There are times when uncritical belief is vital, when little
self-doubt can be tolerated, when wholehearted commitment
is needed (pp. 188-89).
Bollinger also argues that if circumstances are extreme, and
people cannot be induced to be tolerant, there is no point in trying
to force them. That will just overtax their capacity for tolerance
and defeat the effort to teach them its value (p. 182). This is the
reason, Bollinger explains, for denying First Amendment protection to fighting words (p. 183); it is equally true of certain political
speech during times of strong popular sentiment. "Certain extraordinary times and conditions exist in any society in which it is
quite simply too much to expect of people that they be self-restrained toward speech behavior, and under which it would be
counterproductive to the aspirational aims of free speech to insist
on toleration" (p. 182).
Bollinger also flatly disagrees with the conventional view that
First Amendment doctrine should be clear and unambiguous so as
to discourage litigation. A "conscientiously ambiguous" doctrine
(p. 192)-such as the "clear and present danger" formula, with the
term "danger" given a "wide and sensitive compass" (p. 193)-is
better than a clear rule. According to Bollinger, the educative function of free speech does not require a clear rule, and a court should
be free to consider in the balance all of the social harms that
speech might cause (pp. 192-93). Litigation is good, not bad, because it gives the forces of intolerance a chance to have their say.
This helps maintain the community's "identity" while also revealing the dark side of intolerance. In addition, if litigation is
widely publicized, it can engage all of society in the educative toleration ritual (p. 195). As Bollinger recognizes, the Skokie controversy itself is a good example of how highly publicized litigation
can serve such a function.
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II.
There are many very valuable things in this book. Bollinger's
theory is original and plausible, and developing an original and
plausible theory in the area of free speech-which has probably
attracted more attention from more talented writers than any
other legal subject-is a truly impressive achievement. It is also
notable that his theory has strong and controversial implications
for First Amendment doctrine. It is not just another way of rationalizing the conventional wisdom.
In addition, Bollinger's theory, in my view, captures a distinctive feature of the First Amendment better than any other theory.
No other theory of free speech explains as effectively why we celebrate the fact that we allow all manner of revolting and untenable
views to be expressed. For example, as Bollinger notes, the judges
who upheld the Nazis' right to march in Skokie-in a reaction that
was quite typical of defenders of the Nazis' rights-excoriated the
Nazis for their views but proudly explained that one of the things
that distinguishes our society from societies like the Third Reich is
that we allow the expression of views we revile (p. 36).1o
The conventional theories of the First Amendment essentially
treat the toleration of speech like the Nazis' as an unfortunate necessity; we know the Nazis' views are wrong, but we have to tolerate them because the alternative-opening the door to the suppression of valuable speech-is worse. That approach does not
explain why we are so proud of tolerating such speech; one does
not ordinarily celebrate having to do the least of available evils.
According to Bollinger, however, tolerating offensive speech is not
a necessary evil but an affirmative good, because it has valuable
educative effects. The celebration is precisely the point. The purpose of allowing groups like the Nazis to speak is to celebrate, and
thereby reaffirm, the value of tolerance and our commitment to it.
Finally, Bollinger's conception of the First Amendment is an
important advance because, unlike the theories he criticizes, it is
contextual and dynamic, not static and abstract. Social institutions
affect the views and habits of those who live under them, and it is
a mistake to evaluate an institution without taking those effects
into account. Many of the theories Bollinger criticizes treat the institution of freedom of speech as a kind of machine that, if allowed
to function, will crank out "good" political outcomes; the "marketplace of ideas" metaphor makes this approach almost explicit. This
10See Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197, 1201 (7th Cir. 1978).
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approach is congenial to lawyers for many reasons-because of the
influence of relatively crude economic models in legal analyses,
such as Holmes's marketplace metaphor; because for the run-ofthe-mill legal doctrine, the immediate practical effects are more
important than the uncertain long-term educative effects; and because concern with long-term educative effects, as opposed to more
specific practical consequences, smacks of "social engineering."
As Bollinger fully recognizes, these are not good reasons for
ignoring or downplaying the effects of free speech on people's habits and views. Free speech is, as Bollinger persuasively argues, not
a mere legal doctrine but a powerful social ethos (p. 7). If freedom
of speech affects people's character, it is far better to understand
those effects and shape the institution in light of them instead of
ignoring the effects, ostrich-like, on the ground that we do not
want to engage in social engineering. Bollinger's theory therefore
provides a much-needed shift of focus from the outcomes the free
speech "market" produces to the long-term effects it has on the
people who live under it.
In this respect, incidentally, I believe that Bollinger follows
Mill. It is unfortunate that Bollinger treats Mill principally as an
exemplar of the "classical" view (e.g., pp. 54-55); he could have
portrayed himself as Mill's heir.1 1 Mill explicitly reacted against a
utilitarian approach that was concerned, as he saw it, only with the
immediate consequences of social decisions and institutions. He
emphasized that the more important effects of social institutions-and particularly of the institution of tolerance-are their
educative effects on human character. 12 Much of his famous justification of liberty, I believe, rests on the view that a climate of liberty will have beneficial long-term educative effects on the human
character. 13
There are several other good things in this book. Bollinger
gives an acute critique of the distinction between regulating the
communicative aspect of behavior and regulating its noncommunicative aspect (pp. 206-09).' 4 Specifically, he points out that actions
'1

Bollinger does hint at this view of Mill at p. 96.

12 See Mill, Bentham T%39-50, 62, in Mill's Philosophy at 30-37, 48 (cited in note 6).

See Mill, On Liberty ch. 2, 1 27, in Mill's Philosophy at 230-32; id. ch. 3,

6-16 at

254-66.
24 See John Hart Ely, Flag Desecration: A Case Study in the Roles of Categorization
and Balancing in First Amendment Analysis, 88 Harv. L. Rev. 1482 (1975). See also the
analyses of this distinction in Geoffrey R. Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, 54 U. Chi. L.
Rev. (forthcoming 1987); Geoffrey R. Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amendment,
25 Win. & Mary L. Rev. 189, 207-17 (1983).
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communicate a variety of messages, and that the danger that the
government is reacting to the message is present in many cases
that current doctrine considers "content neutral" and unproblematic.1 5 Bollinger also embarks on several splendid discussions of the literature on the First Amendment. For example, he
recognizes that the theories of Holmes and Meiklejohn differ from
each other and from his own views. Nevertheless, he is able to argue persuasively that Holmes and Meiklejohn actually focused, as
Bollinger does, "less on the worthiness of speech activity as a basis
for protection and more on something potentially problematic in
the public response to speech acts" (p. 145). Bollinger also points
out the irony that the literature that celebrates free speech itself
manifests an impulse toward intolerance; it often refuses to take
seriously the arguments of those who assert that the institution of
free speech rests on unexamined myths about, for example, the
contribution that offensive speech makes to society (see pp. 23, 7475, 214-15, 222).
III.
Before I discuss some deeper difficulties I have with Bollinger's approach, I should identify a few less important points on
which I believe his argument is vulnerable.
A.
To my mind, Bollinger does not wholly refute the "classical"
theory, primarily because he understates the difficulty and costs of
applying a standard that distinguishes between, for example, the
Nazis' speech and the speech of the civil rights demonstrators. Of
For example, John Hart Ely suggested that government regulation of graffiti on public buildings need not be subjected to close scrutiny so long as the government is not concerned with the message conveyed but is only attempting to avoid the expense of cleaning
the buildings. Ely, 88 Harv. L. Rev. at 1504 (cited in note 14). Bollinger responds that a
graffiti writer is not just conveying the explicit message of her words: she is also "'expressing' disrespect for authority or for public property" (p. 207) and similar attitudes.
[T]hese underlying feelings-or ways of thinking-which are reflected and communicated in the act of defacement, will unquestionably affect our (or our representatives')
responses to the offenders. . . What stirs people to want to punish a speaker is often
not the explicit message at all . . . but what we call . . . the 'insensitivity' or the
'thoughtlessness' or the excessive 'hostility' manifested in the way in which the view is
expressed [pp. 207-08].
Bollinger's argument on this point might even be carried one step further. We often
punish crimes more severely because they reflect a particularly abhorrent attitude-a contempt for the law or for human life, for example. When we do this, are we not punishing the
act in part because of its communicative significance?
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course, as he says, First Amendment doctrine will necessarily require judges to draw some problematic lines, no matter how hard
we try to establish nondiscretionary standards (pp. 36-37). But a
standard that permits the suppression of speech on the ground
that it is extreme, wrong, or distressing, or that it has destructive
consequences, is in a different category.1 6 Such a standard will be
especially susceptible to being used against speech-like that of
the civil rights demonstrators-that is thought to be extreme and
wrong, and that is distressing and destructive because it challenges
institutions that should be uprooted. Consequently, there is good
reason to fear that judges applying a standard designed to permit
the suppression of Nazi speech-for example, a standard that denies protection to speech that arouses racial hatred-might also be
persuaded to allow the suppression of civil rights protests.
If, as Bollinger suggests, one uses a realistic assessment of
costs and benefits in this area, the costs of using a standard that
allows the suppression of too much "extremist" speech must be
counted as enormous. It is easy to think of instances in which important changes were brought about by speech that many people
regarded as extreme, and that might have been suppressed had the
legal barriers been more flexible. The abolitionist movement and
protests against the war in Vietnam, as well as the civil rights
movement, are probably examples. Obviously changes in these areas were not brought about by speech alone, but the fact remains
that, at least in a reasonably cohesive and democratic society, the
classical defense of free speech is quite plausible: when a substantial number of citizens make a strong, persistent, and sincere moral
appeal, their fellow citizens are sometimes moved to reexamine
their own views and to consider positions that they had previously
thought to be extreme.
In addition, Bollinger's treatment of the line-drawing problem
seems to underestimate the importance of a central function of the
law. One of the principal purposes of the law is to help maintain
stability by identifying, or creating, areas of agreement among people who strongly disagree on questions that are important to them.
This is a reason-not always a sufficient reason, of course-to
avoid doctrines that require judges to take positions on divisive issues. A segregationist who would never agree that civil rights
protesters are less pernicious than Nazis might be willing to assent
16 At times Bollinger seems to make just this point-and quite well. See, e.g., p. 36. But
his rejection of the classical model depends crucially on discounting the problems of linedrawing.
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to the proposition that it is the American way that everyone have a
chance to speak out. By avoiding the question that arouses the
most violent disagreement-whether the civil rights demonstrators' speech is, unlike the Nazis' speech, worthwhile-the law can
discover or create common ground. When we make exceptions
based on the content of speech, we risk undermining the capacity
of the law to perform this unifying and stabilizing function. 7
B.
Another difficulty I have with Bollinger's theory is that it may
apply not to First Amendment issues generally but only to extremist speech, and perhaps only to certain cases of extremist speech. If
that is true, then the doctrinal implications he draws from his theory, while still important, are substantially less dramatic than they
first appear to be.
This difficulty is suggested by Bollinger's quick dismissal of
the version of the fortress theory that sees the First Amendment as
a bulwark against government, as opposed to popular, efforts to
suppress speech. Bollinger argues that episodes like Skokie and the
McCarthy era involved not independent actions by government officials but attempts at suppression by a genuine democratic majority (pp. 79-80). Many disputes about freedom of speech, however-and probably most disputes that raise unresolved legal
issues-do not involve outpourings of popular intolerance. They
often concern relatively low-visibility issues of which most members of the public are probably unaware. They therefore fit the fortress theory's model of government officials limiting speech on
their own initiative. This seems to be true, for example, of most
"public forum" cases, and in general of many of the Supreme
Court's recent First Amendment cases. 8
In such cases, the fortress model has much to commend it.

'7 Of course, we may not want the law to perform this function. See, e.g., Roberto Mangabeira Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement, 96 Harv. L. Rev. 561, 567-70, 583-602
(1983). But as long as we do want it to perform this function, it will sometimes be useful for
legal rules to avoid forcing judges to decide highly controversial issues.
IS See, e.g., Bethel School District No. 403 v. Fraser, 106 S. Ct. 3159 (1986); City of Los
Angeles v. Preferred Communications, 106 S. Ct. 2034 (1986); Pacific Gas & Elec. Co. v.
Pub. Util. Comm'n of California, 106 S. Ct. 903 (1986); United States v. Albertini, 105 S. Ct.
2897 (1985); Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. and Educ. Fund, 105 S. Ct. 3439 (1985); United
States v. Albertini, 105 S. Ct. 2897 (1985); Clark v. Community for Creative Non-Violence,
468 U.S. 288 (1984); Minnesota Bd. for Community Colleges v. Knight, 465 U.S. 271 (1984);
Perry Ed. Assn. v. Perry Local Educators' Assn., 460 U.S. 37 (1983); Heffron v. Int. Soc. for
Krishna Consc., Inc., 452 U.S. 640 (1981).
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When free speech conflicts with other interests, government officials may have a tendency systematically to undervalue the interest in protecting speech. One could argue that the role of the
courts is to correct this bureaucratic tendency. The tendency to
suppress speech comes from numerous sources. 19 Officials may
tend to overvalue short-term, concrete interests that conflict with
allowing free speech, and to undervalue the more abstract, longterm interests served by speech. Free speech (assuming it does not
involve the press) may be less well defended by the kind of organized constituent groups that are effective in influencing government officials. Free speech may tend to create disorder, and officials might place undue emphasis on the need to maintain control.
Officials may be less able to sympathize with the relatively powerless outsiders who must resort to somewhat disorderly speech than
with the representatives of groups whose interests are in conflict
with those of the speakers. Finally, of course, to the extent the
speech criticizes the officials themselves, their concern for their
own reputations and positions may cause them to be unduly hostile to it.
For these reasons, the fortress model gives a satisfactory account of why speech is protected in many First Amendment contexts-including cases of extremist speech-where the impetus for
suppression comes from government officials. In these cases, Bollinger's theory might provide an additional reason for protecting
speech, but it would not serve as a basis for reducing protection
below the levels dictated by the fortress theory. Bollinger's arguments for reducing protection would be confined to the relatively
rare cases of the Skokie or "red scare" variety, where the attempts
at suppression reflect true popular sentiment. And in view of the
difficulty and risks involved in distinguishing cases in which officials act on their own initiative from those in which their actions
reflect popular sentiment, the protections dictated by the fortress
theory arguably should apply across the board; Bollinger's theory
might never justify reduced protection.
C.
Bollinger's own theory might not survive the kind of challenges he makes, quite effectively, to the classical and fortress
models. One point comes immediately to mind, and Bollinger,

9 See generally David Goldberger, Judicial Scrutiny in Public Forum Cases: Misplaced
Trust in the Judgment of Public Officials, 32 Buff. L. Rev. 175, 206-13 (1983).
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characteristically, acknowledges it (pp. 244-45): the empirical psychological premises underlying his theory are not obviously true. It
is not at all clear that people who are forced to tolerate speech
they abhor will become more tolerant in other contexts; they might
easily become less tolerant, in which case Bollinger's theory would
collapse. Indeed, it would become an argument for suppression.
It would, however, be a mistake to make too much of this objection. As I understand Bollinger's enterprise, he has tried to
show that many deeply-rooted judgments and attitudes about free
speech-for example, that speech should not be suppressed solely
on the ground that it is wrong or offensive, and that the tolerance
of such speech is something to be celebrated-make sense only if
the purpose of the First Amendment is to educate people to be
more tolerant throughout political life. To the extent he has succeeded in showing this, he has done something very valuable. He
has demonstrated, among other things, that if in fact protecting
extremist speech does not have this educative effect, we all have
some rethinking to do. Either we should rethink our views about
extremist speech, or we must develop a new justification for protecting it.
Perhaps a more serious difficulty with Bollinger's view is that
it is vulnerable to a charge he levels against the fortress theory-indeed, more vulnerable to this objection than the fortress
theory itself. Bollinger argues that the fortress model-insofar as it
views the First Amendment as a bulwark against popular efforts to
squelch dissidence-creates a system that is "manipulative,"
"alienating," "elitist," and fundamentally at odds with the values
of rational discourse that free speech is usually thought to promote
(pp. 101-03). Although Bollinger does not put the point in these
terms, he seems to be saying that the fortress model does not satisfy the requirement, emphasized by Kant and Rawls, that the rea20
sons for social institutions must be capable of being made public.
Specifically, Bollinger suggests that the fortress model divides
the world between the intolerant masses, who would eradicate all
heterodoxy if they had the chance, and an elite that alone understands the value of protecting a wide range of speech. The institutions of free speech are designed by the elite to hold the masses in
check. But since the masses obviously cannot be told that, the only
way to hold them in check is to publicize essentially false stories
about free speech-for example, that the language or history of the
20 See Immanuel Kant, Perpetual Peace, in Hans Reiss, ed., Kant's Political Writings
125-30 (1970); John Rawls, A Theory of Justice 133 & n.8 (1971).
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First Amendment unambiguously prohibits all suppression, or that
all speech, even Nazi speech, contributes to progress. Judges and
others responsible for maintaining the institution of free speech
cannot acknowledge that the original intent of the First Amendment is unclear, or that we do not have a fully satisfactory explanation of why all speech must be protected. Once they admitted
that there was some doubt about whether extremist speech must
be protected, the waves of mass intolerance would rip through the
cracks in the dike and swamp all valuable unorthodox speech.
Bollinger asserts that there is something wrong with an institution that can survive only by propagating a series of noble lies
about its absoluteness and necessity (pp. 87-89, 102). It would be
especially ironic, he notes, if the defenders of free speech-whose
rhetoric emphasizes the importance of vigorously debating all
preconceptions-had to rely on an uncritical acceptance of aspects
of the institution of free speech itself (e.g., pp. 74-75).
This is a powerful argument. But a similar argument can be
made against Bollinger's theory. Like the fortress model, Bollinger's view begins from the premise that people generally are deficient in their ability to respond rationally to ideas and behavior
that they dislike. But where the fortress view prescribes rigid doctrinal barriers to guard against the impulse toward intolerance,
Bollinger prescribes a kind of collective psychotherapy.2 ' We are to
force ourselves to come face to face with our own impulse toward
intolerance so that we can understand and control it better. Both
theories can be seen as involving the imposition of a regime-rigid
barriers in the one case, therapy in the other-on the ignorant, intolerant masses by an elite that alone understands both the virtues
of tolerance and the way to manipulate institutions in order to
achieve it.
On the other hand, it is possible to defend both the fortress
theory and Bollinger's view against this charge. People can recognize their own deficiencies and voluntarily take actions to deal
with them; the institution of free speech might be seen as a collective choice of a way to deal with the impulse toward intolerance.
Bollinger's theory would be comparable to a collective decision to
submit to the kind of therapy that he believes the tolerance of abhorrent expression supplies. This seems to be the way Bollinger
understands it (see pp. 136-37). But by the same token, the fortress model is comparable to the familiar story of Odysseus tying
11At

one point Bollinger even uses the word "treatment" to describe what tolerance

provides (p. 244).
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himself to the mast;22 we recognize that we may be tempted to be
intolerant, so we all collectively decide, ahead of time and in a cool
hour, to make it more difficult for any of us to give in to that impulse when it occurs.2 s
It is therefore possible that neither theory is elitist and manipulative in the way that Bollinger describes. In fact, it seems to me
that a person who is forced to hear or see painfully abhorrent
speech would feel more imposed upon, would feel that his autonomy had been more invaded, if he were told Bollinger's story-that
he was being subjected to an admittedly painful therapeutic process designed to improve his own self-control. One would feel less
imposed upon and manipulated if he were told, in accordance with
the fortress theory, that in view of the dangers of popular overreaction, it will be better for all of us if we agree to make intolerance a
more difficult choice.
IV.
On a more fundamental level, I have two substantial and related reservations about Bollinger's theory. First, this book is, in a
sense, deeply conservative-in a way that Bollinger does not attempt to justify. Second, I do not think Bollinger succeeds in explaining why tolerance is desirable after all.

22 See generally Jon Elster, Ulysses and the Sirens (rev. ed. 1984); and, in this issue,
Cass R. Sunstein, Legal Interference with Private Preferences, 53 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1129,
1140-45 (1986).
23 This is similar to the basic idea of theories that derive a principle of tolerance from a
social contract. See John Locke, A Letter Concerning Toleration
1956); Rawls, A Theory of Justice at 206-16 (cited in note 20).

7-9 (J.W. Gough ed.

Incidentally, I believe it is a weakness of Bollinger's account that he does not deal seriously with social contract theories of tolerance. Such theories hold, roughly speaking, that
people would adopt a principle of tolerance to govern society if they were situated in a way
that eliminates circumstances that should be irrelevant to the decision of moral questions-for example, if they did not know their particular abilities, interests, or positions in

society. See, e.g., Rawls, A Theory of Justice at 206-16.
In the only passage I can find in which Bollinger makes remarks bearing on the correctness of social contract views-he never addresses them as such-he suggests that such a

view "introduces into our public institutions . . . an unfortunate manipulative frame of
mind, a warfare mentality where each side is tacitly setting the rules by which future battles

will be fought. One wonders whether the legal institutions of this country ought to be engaged in this kind of implicit bargaining. . . instead of attempting to reach for nobler ends"
(p. 102). This argument overlooks the fact that a social contract theory can attempt to define the agreement people would make in a hypothetical situation not characterized by the
inequalities and differences that give rise to "manipulation" and a "warfare mentality."
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A.
When I say that this book is conservative, I do not mean that
it would give government greater power to regulate speech than
existing doctrine allows; on balance it is not clear that it would. I
am referring instead to the way in which Bollinger argues for his
conclusions. The typical way to argue in favor of an institution or
policy is to show that it is consistent with (or, better still, dictated
by) a set of more abstract normative premises. For example, in political philosophy, one might argue that an institution is dictated
by a principle of utility or a conception of a social contract; in constitutional law, one would argue that certain results follow from an
established body of doctrine, the intent of the framers, or the purposes underlying a constitutional provision.
Bollinger's method is very different. He takes something that
people do, either individually or as a society, and he examines it
with great sensitivity and sympathy, seeking to find out what
human need it serves. When he identifies the need that the practice or institution serves, that tends to become, for him, the justification for the practice. This is why Bollinger frequently analyzes
complex or problematic social practices by showing how they arise
from the same psychological impulses as everyday human behavior: he is trying to understand why we do certain things. 4 He is
usually successful.
But understanding a practice is different from justifying it. To
the extent that Bollinger equates the two, he creates a profound
conservative bias, a bias that he does not defend. That is, Bollinger
concentrates on understanding existing practices rather than challenging them by comparing them to an ideal. As a result, he is deflected from suggesting that any deeply rooted practices are worthless or pernicious.
This point is illustrated by Bollinger's treatment of the two
central notions in his theory-intolerance and tolerance. Bollinger
asserts that to deny people the power to satisfy the impulse toward
intolerance is to impose a serious cost on them (see pp. 65-73, 192,
243). One of Bollinger's most significant criticisms of the classical
theory is that it wrongly ignores the need to satisfy this impulse (p.
72-73). To justify this position, Bollinger notes that people and
communities can feel deeply threatened by the expression of abhorrent ideas (e.g., pp. 68-71). He points out that one reason we
24 See also Geoffrey P. Miller, The Glittering Eye of the Law, 84 Mich. L. Rev. 1901
(1986), reviewing Joseph Vining, The Authoritative and the Authoritarian (1986).
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react so strongly against some kinds of actions is not because of
their intrinsic quality but because of the "mind"-the ideas and
attitudes-revealed by the action (pp. 114-16). He gives as an example (in a slightly different context) the threat to its national
identity that the United States felt when its citizens were held hostage at the American Embassy in Teheran from 1979-1981; it was
the attitudes that that act revealed on the part of the captors, he
says, that caused us to react so strongly (p. 114). Similarly, as I
noted, Bollinger argues for allowing suppression of speech in wartime by describing the uncritical commitment one feels toward a
family member and suggesting that one feels a similar commitment
toward one's nation in wartime (pp. 188-91).
Bollinger's accounts are persuasive as descriptions of why people are intolerant. But they do not justify such intolerance. They
do not explain why we should count it against the classical theory
that it denies people the opportunity to act on their impulse toward intolerance. One might argue that the First Amendment
means precisely that feelings of being threatened by an idea or of
wanting to dissociate oneself from it should not carry any weight in
the governmental process. (One could draw an analogy to the reform tradition in criminal law that has argued that only concrete
consequences, and not the bare desire to express intolerance for
criminal behavior, should play a role in determining criminal punishments.2 5). Such an interpretation of the First Amendment may
be wrong, but it cannot be refuted simply by giving an account-even one as sensitive as Bollinger's-of how and when we
feel our identity is threatened.
Similarly, it might be argued that we should define our identity in such a way that it is not threatened by abhorrent speech or
nose-thumbing by hostile nations. Bollinger's theory asserts that if
we want to redefine our identity in this way-that is, by making
ourselves less intolerant-the institution of free speech will help
us. But his theory provides no guidance as to the extent to which
we should try to purge ourselves of the impulse toward intolerance.
Bollinger plainly believes that the impulse toward intolerance
needs some moderating (e.g., p. 73). But nothing in his theory dictates that conclusion or suggests to what extent the impulse should
be moderated. And his theory seems simply to assume that we cannot redefine our identities so as to do without intolerance completely. Similarly, one might answer Bollinger's argument about
,5 See, e.g., H.L.A. Hart, Essays on Bentham 45-46 (1982) (discussing Bentham and
Beccaria).
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speech in wartime by pointing out that a nation is not a family,
and that an uncritical attitude toward one's nation is not morally
on a par with an uncritical attitude toward family members (even
assuming that one should maintain an uncritical attitude toward
family members when they have acted wrongly).
Bollinger uses the same approach, with the same limitations,
in analyzing tolerance. Consider, for example, his excellent insight
that other views do not adequately explain why we are so proud of
our toleration of extremist speech. Bollinger assumes that our celebration of tolerance serves a valuable function, and he proceeds to
explain what that function might be. A more cynical or radical observer might take a different view of the celebration. Such an observer would point out that, as Bollinger himself emphasizes, the
First Amendment inhibits only the imposition of legal restrictions;
it leaves untouched many other actions that can powerfully discourage unpopular speech-actions ranging from ridicule and social ostracization to official denunciations like those in the Skokie
opinions (see pp. 12-13, 29, 109-10). As a result of these extra-legal
sanctions, and probably also of such influences as schools and popular culture, American society, as Bollinger again notes, shows a
great deal of ideological conformity. We are not troubled by balkanized parliaments, the danger of a military coup, or extremist
groups that seriously threaten the government, and there is a
broad consensus on liberal democratic values. We have never even
had an overtly socialist or overtly aristocratic major political party.
A critic might say that, against this background, our self-congratulation for allowing groups like the Nazis to march is empty
and hypocritical. He would say that our vaunted tolerance consists
of allowing a small, pathetic, reviled group to stage a pointless
demonstration after we have made sure, through powerful informal
controls, that its ideas will have no effect.26 He would say that our
pride in tolerating the Nazis comes very cheap; we have never had
any real Nazi threat in our country, and it is therefore easy for us
to regard the Nazis as absurd curiosities. Or a critic might go one
step further and say that the self-congratulatory tolerance ritual
that Bollinger identifies is worse than empty; it helps defuse opposition by furthering the illusion that we have a tolerant society
when in fact, in many important ways, our society is deeply con26 Consider, e.g., Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 628-30 (1919) (Holmes, J.,

dissenting) (quoted in Bollinger at p. 60) (remarking that the case involved "puny anonymities" and "a silly leaflet [published] by an unknown man").

1986]

Why Be Tolerant?

1505

formist and intolerant.27 I am not suggesting that these views are
necessarily superior to Bollinger's. But they are not obviously
wrong, and Bollinger does not address them. He appears not to
consider the possibility that the tolerance of extremist speech
might serve a perverse, as opposed to a valuable, function.
B.
Finally, and paradoxically, I am not sure that Bollinger ever
explains why tolerance is valuable. For him, of course, tolerance of
extremist speech is not intrinsically valuable; it is desirable only
because it helps people be more tolerant in other contexts, where
tolerance is needed. In particular, Bollinger says that tolerance is
crucial to the success of a democracy:
[A] capacity to contain one's beliefs in the interest of maintaining a continuing community is critical. . . . Those who
possess the power to see their choices put into effect must decide whether and how far to press ahead in the face of opposition. Those in the minority must decide whether to accede to
the will and power of the majority or in what ways to continue
the fight. . . . In this sense, therefore, the capacity sought
through free speech bears a special relevance to the actual
functioning of a democratic system of government [pp. 117-18,
citations omitted].
But why is tolerance the capacity that democracy requires?
27 See, e.g., Herbert Marcuse, Repressive Tolerance, in A Critique of Pure Tolerance 84

(1965).
28

I hope it is not unfair to use this passage as a summary of Bollinger's explanation of

why tolerance is desirable. Bollinger emphasizes that the impulse toward intolerance can
affect both decisions about what kinds of behavior to allow and decisions about how severely
to punish the behavior we do not allow. He suggests that tolerance is needed to temper the
impulse toward intolerance in both contexts (pp. 108-17). But except for quoting a passage
from Aristotle that endorses the golden mean (p. 116), he does not explain why the impulse
toward intolerance must be tempered. Why should the community's process of self-definition not be allowed to operate unimpeded?
Elsewhere, Bollinger suggests that tolerance is desirable because it instills "the spirit of
compromise basic to our politics" (p. 141) and "the willingness to compromise and accommodate" (p. 228). This seems to me the same point as that made in the passage I quote in
the text. Bollinger also mentions that tolerance is an important virtue for lawyers and bureaucrats, including judges, because they must frequently subordinate their own values to
the values of others (see p. 118). Bollinger makes interesting use of this insight. For example, he suggests that it may explain why our society, in which so many people occupy bureaucratic roles, currently values tolerance (pp. 238-39). But it does not explain why we
should incur costs in order to try to make the whole society more tolerant; tolerance (like
aggressiveness, physical courage, or strength) could remain just a qualification for certain
professions.
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Many other capacities seem to be equally effective in causing political winners not to press their advantage to the point of instability,
and political losers not to rebel. Enlightened long-term self-interest alone might suffice; both winners and losers may believe that
they have more to gain from preserving the system than from disrupting it. Indeed, in most reasonably democratic societies, this
seems likely to be true of the losers and is certainly true of the
winners. If long-term self-interest is sufficient to maintain the
democratic system, we do not need to teach tolerance by tolerating
extremist speech; we only need institutions that teach people to be
rationally self-interested.
Other qualities also seem sufficient: patriotism; a sense of fair
play, comparable to that which causes competitors not to cheat
even when they can escape detection; or a belief in democratic institutions. Not all of these qualities will correlate well with tolerance, and there is no reason to believe that tolerating extremist
speech-and thus incurring the very real costs that Bollinger emphasizes-is the most efficient way to cultivate these qualities. Bollinger's theory tells us (assuming its empirical premises are correct) how to make society more tolerant; but it does not tell us why
we would want to do so.
Indeed, it seems that passivity-a quality that Bollinger is
careful to distinguish from tolerance-would do at least as well as
tolerance in maintaining stability in a democracy. As long as the
losers are passive, democracy will survive. And one might ask why
Bollinger confines his reasoning to democracies. There are winners
and losers in any society, and no society can survive unless the
losers submit and the winners do not press their advantage too far.
If anything, non-democracies are even more in need of tolerance,
because they cannot count on other qualities-such as self-interest
among the losers and the sense of fair play-to the same extent as
a democracy can. But undemocratic societies do not usually have
an institution of free speech to teach tolerance to their citizens.
Bollinger does not address these problems; he does not adequately explain why he sees a close connection between tolerance
and democracy. One possible explanation of the connection, of
course, is that self-government requires active, engaged citizens
and will fail if citizens are merely passive. But Bollinger does not
give this kind of explanation, because it belongs to the classical
model that he rejects. Indeed, he makes a fine argument that a
version of this view actually animated Meiklejohn's thought (pp.
148-58). It is possible to imagine the answer Bollinger would give
to such an argument: Does democracy really require that all citi-
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zens be active and engaged? Isn't it enough that there is an active
and engaged elite, along with citizens who bestir themselves from
time to time when self-interest, or a very weighty moral interest, is
at stake? That is probably an accurate description of our society.
An active and engaged citizenry is necessary to one particular form
of democracy, characterized by a high degree of participation and
civic virtue. But one must then explain why it should be a function
of the First Amendment to bring about such a democracy, as opposed to, for example, the one we now have.
This interesting and insightful book teaches us a great deal
about tolerance and the First Amendment. It also paints a picture
of the tolerant mind and the tolerant society and invites one to
admire it, which one instinctively does. It paints this picture both
explicitly-in several eloquent passages on the importance of reasonableness and intellectual integrity-and in the way it asserts its
own position. But in the end, one is left with the question that
perhaps no one has completely answered: what is so good about
tolerance?

